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Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory
Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering
Applied to Minnesota
Charles Backstrom*
Leonard Robins**
Scott Eller***
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
With the approach of 1980 a new round of legislative redistricting' will shortly be upon us.2 Not surprisingly, organized groups are
showing their periodic interest in the subject. The Republican Party's
pragmatic concern, looking at the overwhelming number of state legislatures and governorships controlled by Democrats,3 is that unless
*
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1. The terms districting,redistricting,apportionment,and reapportionmentare
treated as equivalents in common parlance. Technically, however, apportionmentand
reapportionmentinvolve the allocation of a finite number of representatives among a
fixed number of pre-established areas. Districtingand redistricting,on the other hand,
refer to the processes by which the lines separating legislative districts are drawn.
Thus, state legislatures redistricttheir states after they know the number of seats that
have been apportionedto each state from among the 435 seats in the United States
House of Representatives. See note 2 infra.
Since counties and other geographic units are not considered fixed units entitled
to a certain number of legislative seats, the term redistricting, rather than
reapportionment,is used correctly in referring to state legislative seats.
2. Apportionment of the United States House of Representatives is mandated by
the Constitution: "Representatives. . . shall be apportioned among the several States
. . . according to their respective Numbers .

. .

. The actual Enumeration shall be

made. .. within every... Term of ten Years in such Manner as they shall by Law
direct." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. The mechanics of House reapportionment begins

with the publication of results of the decennial United States Census. After setting 435
as the total number of representatives, the Congress has delegated to the Bureau of
the Census the task of calculating the number of representatives to which each state
is entitled. This calculation is to be made according to the method of equal proportions, with no state having less than one representative. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1976).
Congress then requires that the states be subdivided into districts, with the only
requirement being that single-member districts be used. See id. § 2c. The states are
allowed to choose the means of subdividing. Should any state legislature fail to redistrict according to population, the appropriate United States district court will accept
jurisdiction and provide a remedy, drawing the district lines itself, if necessary. See
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
3. After the 1976 elections, Democrats controlled both legislative houses and the
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Republicans can win a significant portion of the 1978 races, Democrats will be able to redistrict in such a.way as to perpetuate their
majority position both in state legislatures and in the United States
House of Representatives for another decade.4 Common Cause, the
self-described "citizens lobby," also has placed reapportionment high
on its agenda, but with the goal of removing the issue from partisan
politics by requiring that legislative districting be done by nonpartisan commissions in order to "bypass the self-interest of incumbent
legislators and set objective standards for reapportionment."6
The concern of both groups is gerrymandering.7 Throughout our
history, the gerrymander has existed without much more than moral
indignation to combat it. Today, it remains the last major obstacle
to fair and effective representation, for while the Supreme Court has
eliminated gross inequities in population among legislative districts,8
there is as yet no guarantee that the district lines will themselves be
fairly drawn. Just as districting based on population equality was
worthwhile as a contribution to political equality, so too an effective
remedy for gerrymandering would contribute significantly to increased fairness in the political process One commentator who advogovernorship in 29 states, one house and the governorship in four states, the governorship alone in five states, and both houses but not the governorship in seven states. In
only one state did Republicans control the governorship and both houses, in three
states the governorship and one house, and in one state one house with an Independent
governor. CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., November 13, 1976, at 3162.
4. Republican National Committee Chairman Bill Brock evidenced this concern
when he stated that the "fundamental goal for this Committee must become the
election of more Republicans to state legislatures. Given the coming of the decennial
census in 1980 and the mandated reapportionment in 1981, no goal can have a higher
priority." Brock, Rebuilding the GOP, FrsT MONDAY, January-February 1977, at 2.
5. See COMMON CAUSE, TOWARD ASYSTEM OF FAmR AND EFFECnVE REPRESENTATION
30-33 (1977).
6. CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., November 26, 1977, at 2481.
7. The term "gerrymandering" has come to describe the excessive manipulation
of the shape of legislative districts. The term is derived from the name of Elbridge
Gerry, who was Governor of Massachusetts in 1812 when the legislature created a
peculiar salamander-shaped district to benefit the party to which he belonged.
8. [Als a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause
requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must
be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individual's right
to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is
in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living
in other parts of the State.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
9. Partisan gerrymandering is a major concern, of course, only in a political
system dominated by party politics. There are those who say that political parties are
irrelevant, or nearly so, in the American system today. While this view seems fashionable, it is wrong. A two-party system has been a dominant aspect of American government for a century and that dominance shows no likelihood of diminishing. Opinion
polls do show that the public at large is disenchanted with the present parties, and
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cates a judicial response has suggested that the courts should create
"a reasonable presumption of gerrymandering [placing] . . .[t]he
burden of explanation and justification . . . upon those responsible
for the representational design." 10 Without precise guidance on how
the presence of gerrymandering can be detected, however, this useful
idea is mere rhetoric.
As a means of making the problem of gerrymandering more amenable to solution, we urge that an effort be made to devise an objective measure of partisan gerrymandering, despite the serious analytic
and research problems this entails. By carefully defining gerrymandering, establishing specific criteria for fair districting, and ultimately proposing a method for evaluating redistricting schemes, we
hope to assist redistricting authorities-whether legislatures, independent commissions, or, if necessary, the courts-in eliminating the
inequities of partisan gerrymandering.
At the outset, however, we wish to dispel the fatalistic notion
that nothing can be done about gerrymandering. While the United
States Supreme Court has thus far refused to declare a redistricting
plan invalid on the ground of partisan gerrymandering," we believe
indeed considerable "party decomposition"-abandonment of prior admitted identification with one of the parties-has occurred. See generally W. BURNHAM, CRITICAL
ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN PoLrrIcs 91-134 (1970). But there is no
concerted move to abandon the existing parties either for third parties or for independents. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the reality of the two-party
system by upholding the public financing of presidential campaigns even though the
allocation of funds is biased toward the existing major parties. See Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976). Almost all congressmen and senators bear the label of one party or
the other. Indeed, competition between the two parties is growing at the state level.
See M.

JEWELL

& D. OLSON,

AMERICAN STATE POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS

48

(1978).
The glib statement that the labels of the two existing parties are simply empty
alternative vehicles for public choice between personalities with no significant policy
or ideological differences is also untrue. Careful investigation shows important, though
not antipodal, differences between partisans in the public and in Congress on contemporary issues. The widest differences can be seen at the level of the party elites-United States' Representatives and Senators. See Backstrom, Congress and the
Public: How Representative Is the One of the Other?, 5 AM. POL. Q. 411 (1977).
10. R. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equi-Populous Gerrymandering 38
(Sept. 3, 1975) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, San Francisco). Not everyone, however, believes that a judicial
response to gerrymandering is appropriate. Thus Dean Auerbach, while emphasizing
the importance of the one person/one vote concept, nonetheless cites mobility of
population, flux in party affiliation, and contradictory estimates of political strategists
trying to achieve partisan advantage as factors that would make it difficult for the
courts effectively to address gerrymandering. See Auerbach, Commentary, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's, at 74 (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
11. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); cf. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (no constitutional violation where a community of
Hasidic Jews was split by a redistricting plan that sought to achieve a fair allocation
of voting strength between white and nonwhite voters).
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that the history of efforts to achieve equal-population districting suggests that continued Court inaction on partisan gerrymandering
should not be assumed nor need it be inevitable. In 1946, the Supreme Court refused to act against.malapportionment because of the
fear of entering a "political thicket."' 2 Subsequently, political scientists developed several measures of malapportionment that dramatically demonstrated the possibility of a minority of the electorate
controlling the electoral process. 3 In 1962, the Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction over reapportionment and set out to enforce the
one person/one vote standard."5 While we cannot demonstrate conclusively a causal link between the increased technical sophistication on
the subject of malapportionment and the Court's subsequent actions,
we are persuaded that the existence of widely accepted measures of
the problem, and therefore criteria for remedial action, facilitated
Court action.'" We believe that a similar methodological development in measuring partisan gerrymandering would facilitate action
if the political will is present.
Nor need the fear of political repercussions preclude judicial action. The belief that dire consequences would befall the Court because of its requirement that redistricting be on the basis of population equality has clearly proven unfounded. Initially, many incumbent state legislators and interest groups that benefited from the
existing order expressed anger at the Court's interventionin the districting process. Their immediate response was to try to withdraw all
jurisdiction of the courts in redistricting suits 7 and then to propose
a constitutional amendment that would have exempted one house of
the state legislatures from the requirement that representation be
12. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
13. 'See P. DAVID & R. EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE
7 (1961); Dauer & Kelsay, Unrepresentative States, 44 NAT'L MuNmcIPAL REv. 571
(1955).
14. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
16. V. 0. Key very early identified as the primary reason for judicial reluctance
to act on reapportionment "the absence of any precise standards by which legislation
on the subject can be tested." Key, Proceduresin State LegislativeApportionment,
26 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1050, 1051 (1932).
17, Legislation to this effect was introduced by Representative Tuck during the
88th Congress, and it passed the House of Representatives on August 19, 1964, by a
vote of 218 to 175. See H.R. 11926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 20300 (1964).
When it reached the Senate, however, the bill was filibustered for a month by liberal
Senators, leading to the substitution of a mild "sense of the Congress" resolution
attached to a pending foreign aid bill that merely asked the courts to give the legislatures six months to act. See 110 CONG. REc. 22758 (1964). House conservatives were so
incensed at the weakness of the Senate action that they persuaded the House conferees
to kill the measure when it reached the conference committee. See CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY SERVICE, CONGRSS AND THE NATION, 1945-1964, at 1526-27 (1965).
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based on population.'" Once these efforts were defeated, however, the
movement to retain the old order quickly lost its appeal. The reason
for this loss of momentum, overlooked by those who feared the Court
would suffer politically for taking jurisdiction on this question, is that
redistricting on the basis of population equality ultimately produced
as many gainers as losers. Once the groups who held power artificially
by delaying redistricting were replaced by the metropolitan benefactors of redistricting, the new majority in the legislatures no longer
clamored for a change in the Constitution. Moreover, having gained
acceptance, the continued availability of a judicial remedy for maldistricting seems likely to ensure that future redistricting as a result
of shifts in population will be accomplished with little opposition.
The political controversy over the Court's earlier equal population
decisions was temporary and self-correcting, indicating that fears of
political repercussions need not be a serious impediment to Court
action to remedy partisan gerrymandering. The reluctance of the
Supreme Court to involve itself in the problem of partisan gerrymandering" seems more readily justified in terms of the absence to date
of any solid measure of gerrymandering and the consequent difficulty
of obtaining convincing proof of its existence.
II. PROPER CRITERIA FOR MEASURING
GERRYMANDERING: PROBLEMS WITH
EXISTING MEASURES
A major problem with several of the methods for measuring gerrymandering currently in vogue is that they rely solely on appearance. In general, if districts appear tidy on a map, analysts assume
there has been no gerrymandering; if districts twist and turn, they
assume that gerrymandering has occurred.
That crooked district lines are a sufficient guide to ascertaining
gerrymandering underlies the recommendations of several commentators who assert that the courts can cure the problem of gerryman18. In 1965, the Senate defeated the "Dirksen amendment," S.J. Res. 2, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REc. 172 (1965), by a vote of 59 to 39, seven votes short of
the required two-thirds majority. See 111 CONG. REc. 19335 (1965). In 1966, the Senate
defeated a similar proposal, S.J. Res. 103, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REc. 20119
(1965), by a vote of 55 to 38, again seven votes short of the required total. See 112 CONG.
REc. 8583 (1966). By 1967, legislatures in 33 states had requested Congress to call a
constitutional convention and submit to the states for ratification an amendment on
this subject. While the number of states requesting such action was only one short of
the number required for calling a constitutional convention, the different wordings of
the states' resolutions cast doubt on the actual closeness of the attempt to compel
congressional action. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CONGRESS AND THE
NATION, 1965-1968, at 423-34 (1969).
19. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 544

(1969). For a thorough review of these cases, see R. Engstrom, supra note 10.
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dering by mandating that legislatures apply certain visual rules in
redistricting." Their assumption is that if courts, while continuing to
require population equality, also require districts to adhere to subdivision boundaries and be compact and contiguous, it will be impossible to gerrymander.
A visual approach has a number of flaws. First, the visual rules
contain implicit operational difficulties because they fail to recognize
that there must be tradeoffs between population equality and following political subdivision lines, or between following subdivision lines
and maintaining compact districts. All simply cannot be maximized
simultaneously since at some point they come into conflict with each
other. Second, to be meaningful, criteria such as compactness and
fidelity to subdivision lines must be expressed not as general guidelines, but as precise, mathematical terms, specifying how much deviation from the ideal will be tolerated. Third, and most important,
reliance on visual rules can be a source of misinformation as well as
information when it comes to identifying a gerrymander. Those holding the view that requiring population equality, compactness, and
adherence to subdivision boundaries will prevent gerrymandering
assume that if these rules are followed, only one districting plan will
be feasible, eliminating the possibility of discretionary line drawing
for partisan advantage. As our case study will show, however, many
plans are in fact possible under fairly strict rules of district compactness, feasible adherence to subdivision boundaries, and population
equality.' This is not to say that rules of this type are unhelpful in
restricting gerrymandering." Indeed, strict population equality standards do make it more difficult to gerrymander: "[T]he artistry of
the political cartographer is put to the highest test when he must
work with constituencies of equal population."' Other typical requirements, such as compactness and respect for subdivision lines,
also place meaningful constraints on the district drawer's freedom to
gerrymander, especially when imposed simultaneously. We therefore
20. Dietsch, The Remarkable Resurgence of Gerry's Gambit, SATURDAY REV.,
June 3, 1972, at 42; Edwards, The Gerrymanderand One Man, One Vote, 46 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 879, 879-99 (1971); Tyler & Wells, The New Gerrymander Threat, AM.
FEDERAONIST, February 1971, at 1-7.

21. See text at pp. 1143-46 infra.
22. It has been suggested that excessive striving for mathematical equality ac-

tively facilitates gerrymandering. See R. DIXoN,

JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION

456-

57 (1968). We expressly reject such'a suggestion. Indeed, in one case in which the

Supreme Court backed off from strict population equality, the empirical result appeared to be the allowance of a gerrymander against a specific region. See Mahon v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 344 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (sacrificing population
equality to allow adherence to local subdivision lines may well have "discriminated
against one region of the state").
23. A. HAcKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING 51 (rev. ed. 1964).
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subscribe to the need for rules on these several criteria, but recognize
that those rules alone are not sufficient to preclude partisan gerrymandering.
Aside from those analysts who emphasize physical appearance as
a means of identifying gerrymandering, others purport to measure
gerrymandering by focusing on the partisan outcome of the legislative
election following a redistricting. 2 Analysts using this approach compare the percentage of a party's legislative vote statewide with the
percentage of seats gained. Marked disparities between the two figures are said to indicate the existence of a gerrymander.
This method of identifying gerrymandering, like the first, has
major flaws. First, the approach fails to account for the fact that the
difference between percentage of vote and number of seats captured
may in fact be the result of natural advantages-the inordinate concentration of partisans in one place-rather than any deliberate partisan districting scheme. For example, it is well-known that Michigan Democrats are heavily concentrated in Detroit but are in a minority in many other parts of the state.a Thus, in every election,
Detroit Democrats will win heavily but their excess votes-those
above fifty percent-do their party no good. Similarly Democrats in
outstate Michigan waste votes in those districts where they are a
strong but persistent minority.28 No tolerable districting plan can
effectively use either kind of votes, but typical postelection bias
measures would show a gerrymander in favor of Michigan Republicans.
Second, gauging party strength by using the sum of party votes
in individual districts instead of the vote totals for some common
statewide race contaminates the results with the effects of a multitude of candidate personalities, campaign techniques, and strictly
local issues. We know that even strongly partisan voters on occasion
vote for a candidate from the opposite party. Yet a disparity between
the vote for all of a party's legislative candidates and the percentage
of seats the party gains would be used by some as evidence of a
gerrymander.Y Any such use of individual district situations as a test
for gerrymandering results in a party being accused of seizing an
24.

See R. DIXoN, JR., supra note 22, at 321 (58% of the statewide vote captured

65% of the seats-an eight-seat "bonus"); A.

HACKER,

supra note 23, at 61 ("The test

employed here is to check on a party's proportion of the total statewide congressional
vote, and how this compared with the proportion of seats that party secured in the
state's congressional delegation."); Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes
in Two-Party Systems, 67 AM. POL. Sci. RPv. 540, 549-53 (1973) (measuring legislative
bias and condemning results in which candidates of one party captured nine out of
fifteen seats, even though they received less than half of the votes cast).
25. See J. LAPALoMBARA, GUmE TO MICmAN PoLiTics 22-35 (1960).
26. See A. HACKER, supra note 23, at 55-57, 68-70.
27. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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undue advantage when it should be congratulated for recruiting outstanding candidates and conducting a first-class campaign for the
legislature.
Aside from the theoretical problems associated with the use of
district vote totals rather than vote totals for a statewide race, practical problems are presented as well. For instance, many legislative
candidates go uncontested. Because the vote from a single uncontested race will in all probability add more to the total of the winning
party than the margin by which several opposition candidates win in
contested races elsewhere, the result will be a distortion in the total
vote considered to reflect overall party strength.
An even more important practical problem of using legislative
votes as a basis for districting, however, is that legislative votes are
not "cross-addable"; that is, it is not accurate to assume that the
votes for a party's candidate in one district would translate into votes
for the same party's candidate in another district. Therefore, as district lines are moved in various redistricting schemes, adding the
votes of different legislative candidates as a means of approximating
party strength within the new district could prove unreliable as an
indicator of the actual political composition of the new district.
Finally, and of special importance, analysts who use the disparity between total vote and seats held after redistricting as evidence of gerrymandering neglect the crucial fact that reapportionment battles are, by their very nature, before-the-fact. That is, during the redistricting process, evaluations of the possible effects of a
plan on the next legislative election must necessarily be based on
electoral behavior that has occurred prior to the redistricting itself.
A measure that purports to be a basis for evaluating a proposed districting plan is not useful unless it is available before the plan has
operated to the possible detriment of one party in an election.
I.

A PROPOSED MEASURE OF GERRYMANDERING

To be effective, a measure of gerrymandering must fulfill a number of specific requirements. Generally, any means of evaluating a
redistricting scheme must take into account the received parameters
within which those charged with redistricting are required to operate.
Thus, for example, districts may be required to exhibit a certain
degree of population equality, compactness, and respect for subdivision lines. Beyond this, a test for gerrymandering must meet three
requirements. First, it must provide a precise definition of gerrymandering, one that takes into account the fact that not all advantages
arising under a redistricting scheme are properly termed gerrymanders. Second, the test must provide a reliable method of estimating
party strength within the state since ultimately whether a gerrymander has occurred depends on how closely the projected representation
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under a particular redistricting scheme approximates the overall
strength of the party. To ensure that the estimate of party strength
is as accurate as possible, the method by which the estimate is made
must, to the extent possible, control for candidate personalities, idiosyncratic campaign techniques, and local issues. Finally, an effective
measure of gerrymandering must be capable of detecting gerrymandering a priori since the object of devising a test in the first place is
to be able to evaluate a proposed redistricting scheme before it is
implemented.
A.

DEFINING GERRYMANDERING

Before we can describe our method of measuring partisan gerrymandering in a two-party system' we must establish a rigorous definition: partisan gerrymandering is gaining through discretionary districting an unjustifiable advantage for one political party as opposed
to the others. This definition insists that not all advantages attained
as a result of a districting plan constitute gerrymandering. For example, the geographic concentration of various social groups within a
state is a common phenomenon.29 Under any districting plan, certain
groups of people will end up dominant in certain districts, thus creating advantages for these groups as opposed to all others. Because our
definition of gerrymandering is limited to districting that is within
28. Partisan gerrymandering can exist in a multiparty system as well. For a
description of how the French and Italian election laws discriminate against the Communist party by this means, see D. RAE, THE PoLricAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL
LAws 137 (1967). In a two-party system, involving single-member districts, there will
always be discrimination against third parties since it is nearly impossible for a small
group to amass sufficient strength to dominate a district. See generally M. DUVERGER,
PouncAL PARIEs 217 (1954).
We do not address here the relevance of our measure of gerrymandering to a multiparty system, nor do we deal with its application to other types of gerrymandering-for
example, racial gerrymandering-though we acknowledge the importance of such issues. Indeed, it should be noted that the strategies involved in racial gerrymandering
may be considerably different from those involved in partisan gerrymandering. The
strategic goal of political party draftsmen is always to concentrate their partisans
within a district so as to constitute a majority. By contrast, racial minorities could seek
to maximize their political power by distributing significant pockets of minority voters
among a large number of districts, thus hoping to have some degree of influence over
as many elected representatives as possible, rather than concentrating their numbers
within a relatively few districts in the hopes of actually electing a minority candidate.
29. Only if the basis of legislative representation were changed from a singlemember district system to a proportional representation system, such as existed in the
Fourth French Republic, could all important factions, wherever they lived, be represented rather accurately in the legislative body. But proportional representation tends
to produce certain undesirable side effects-such as fragmentation of political parties
and inability to obtain a majority in the legislature-which contribute to instability
in government. For the technical explanation of this relationship, see D. RAE, supra
note 28.
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the discretion of district designers to counteract, any advantage that
a party may attain because of a concentration of its supporters is
termed "natural"30 and is not a gerrymander since it cannot be reduced further under any plan.
Similarly, we exclude from our definition of partisan gerrymandering advantages that accrue to the benefit of specific individuals,
typically incumbents. An example might be a legislator who seeks to
have her district drawn to include a particular slice of territory that
includes major campaign supporters, a district that permits occupational identification (a farmer in a largely farm district), or a district
beneficial to someone with a locally famous family name. Another
and more important example of such individual advantages would
result if districts were drawn so as to maximize the reelection chances
of all incumbents. 3 ' Such idiosyncratic advantages from district
drawing, while real and important, are individualistic and therefore
not universally recognizable nor measurable by reference to party
strength. Therefore, it is hard to imagine effective remedies to deal
with all of these ad hominem advantages, and indeed, the desirability
of trying to eliminate them is questionable. 2
Whatyemains as gerrymandering are those districting decisions
that give to one political party a representational advantage that is
unjustified in relation to its statewide support and that could be
reduced by opting for some other districting scheme that is possible
given the received criteria of population equality, compactness, and
30. We are not saying that ethnic ghettos, concentrations of partisans, or any
other geographical group patterns are "natural" in the sense that they are uninfluenced by prior human decisions. Those having the responsibility of drawing legislative
districts, however, cannot be expected to alter significantly the effects of society,
geography, and history. Thus, the district designers must accept as "givens" the demographic conditions existing at the time of redistricting.
31. The intended result of what others call "bipartisan" gerrymandering is to
reduce the possibility of one party capturing seats held by the other, that is, to minimize the "swing ratio." Although we do not address ourselves to this problem, we share
the fear of those who have noted that declining swing ratios may ultimately lead to
increased rigidity in decisionmaking and insensitivity to changing public opinion on
the part of seemingly unbeatable legislators. See Erickson, Malapportionment,Gerrymandering, and PartyFortunes in CongressionalElections, 66 AM. POL. Sco. REv. 1234
(1972); Lebedoff, The Essential Reform, HARPERS, October 1976, at 16-19; Mayhew,
CongressionalRepresentation: Theory and Practice in Drawing the Districts, in
REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's,

supra note 10, at 249; Tufte, supra note 24, at 549-53.

Recent studies have suggested, however, that the difficulty in beating incumbents
may be less attributable to the way districts are drawn than to either a general decline
in ideology or, more probably, to the growth of incumbents' ability to perform constituent services. See, e.g., Ferejohn, On the Decline of Competition in Congressional
Elections, 71 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 166 (1977); Fiorina, The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It, 71 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 177 (1977).
32. For a thorough discussion of representation theory, see H. PrrUN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
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adherence to subdivision lines. The paradigmatic examples of such
decisions are, of course, conscious-those that occur when Democrats
try to benefit themselves at the expense of Republicans and vice
versa. It should be emphasized, however, that our definition of gerrymandering is an objective one. Misrepresentation is an evil whether
it is intentional or not, and a person contesting a districting plan
should not be required to prove scienter. Any plan, even one constructed by a nonpartisan or bipartisan reapportionment commission, will have political effects. A tossed coin can be completely neutral, but using it to allocate legislative seats could produce highly
distorted results." To a group discriminated against under such a
plan, it would be only mildly comforting to know that its woes were
not deliberately planned.
B.

CHOOSING A DATA BASE

Having defined gerrymandering, the first step in measuring it is
to select an adequate indicator of relative strength of the political
parties in the state's electorate. This indicator is the "base percentage" and, once chosen, it is used to produce an estimate of the
percentage of the electorate in each of the proposed districts that, all
else being equal, could be expected to vote for candidates of a particular party simply because of that affiliation. Deciding which election
will be used as the base race is one of the difficult choices required
in developing a measure of gerrymandering. Questions about the reliability of any measure of statewide partisan strength can always be
raised. Yet for all that, some estimate of overall party strength is
clearly a necessity for any measure of gerrymandering. Any choice
involves trade-offs that can and will affect the ultimate decision.
What is necessary is to attend to the costs and benefits of each choice
and, given those parameters, to choose the one that is most likely to
be accurate and administratively feasible.
Given the wide political variation among states, it would be presumptuous to suggest that a single race or average of races would be
optimal everywhere, or even at all times in a single place, for use as
the base percentage. We can, however, indicate a number of considerations that should guide the choice. It is first necessary to eliminate two superficially attractive alternatives. One of these is the
use of party registration figures. Most states do not provide for voter
registration by party.34 Even if these data were available, however,
33. See Nagel, Computers & the Law & Politics of Redistricting, 5 PoLrrY 77
(1972).
34. See generally M. BARONE, G. UJIPUSA, & D. MATrHEWS, THE ALMANAC OF
AMEWCAN PoLrrcs passim (1972) (27 states provided no figures for voter registration

by party).
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party registration would not be a satisfactory base for evaluating
districting plans because of the loose correlation between voting behavior and registration 5 and the impossibility of accurately allocating the growing number of independents. 6
Another figure infeasible for use as a base percentage is a state's
"normal vote."3 The normal vote for a state is the percentage split
between the parties that could be expected in an election if all other
factors were equal. It is derived by survey research techniques using
party identification and the differential likelihood of various partisans to turn out at elections and eliminating the distorting short-term
effects of particular issues and candidates.18 The critical weakness of
using the normal vote as abase percentage for evaluating a districting
plan is that it is a statewide figure, not disaggregable to legislative
districts nor to precincts or census tracts, the fundamental units
traded between districts in changing legislative district lines. In order
to obtain survey data sufficient to enable accurate estimates of party
strength for each precinct or tract in the state, a substantial number
of voters would have to be surveyed in each subunit, amounting to a
total of hundreds of thousands of voters throughout the state. This
technique would be prohibitively expensive and literally impossible
to manage. 9
There are really only two acceptable options for figuring a base
percentage: use of either a single "typical" statewide race or a composite of several statewide races. Each-has its advantages and disadvantages. A consideration in favor of using a single typical race is that
in mpst states some relatively invisible office, such as State Public
Service Commissioner, can be considered a relatively accurate measure of base partisan electoral strength, because, in the absence of an
extensive personality-oriented campaign, voters tend to follow only
35. For a general overview of the rise of split-ticket voting, see Burnham, The
United States: The Politics of Heterogeneity, in R. RosE, ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 714-15
(1974).
36. On the rise of independents, see F. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 166
(3d ed. 1976).
37. The concept of the normal vote was developed by Philip E. Converse. See
A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER, & D. STOKES, ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL

9-39 (1966).
38. The methodology involves calculating separately the expected turnout proportions, strength of partisanship relative to short-term forces, and level of political
involvement of each of the five classifications of party identifiers (Strong Democrats,
ORDER

Weak Democrats, Independents, Weak Republicans, and Strong Republicans) and

then unifying these estimates. See id.
39. See Backstrom & Agranoff, Aggregate Election Data in the Campaign:Limitations, Pitfalls, and Uses, in THE NEW STYLE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 204-05 (2d ed.
R. Agranoff 1976).
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the cue of party designation on the ballot." Another consideration
that is by no means insignificant is that the use of a single race vastly
simplifies the task of acquiring and manipulating data. A point
against the use of a single race is the possible difficulty of reaching
agreement on which race to use. It is important that the candidates
in the chosen race have no particularly attractive or negative characteristics differentially affecting certain parts of the state-for example, an ethnic name if fellow ethnics are concentrated in a certain
section of the state, or advocacy of a strong position on environmental
preservation if that position poses an economic threat to a particular
section of the state. Since the base percentage will be used to estimate party strength in particular precincts as they are moved from
one potential district to another, local distortions such as these are
highly undesirable.
The other acceptable base measure of partisan strength is an
average of several statewide partisan races from recent elections. In
its favor, an average finesses the controversy over which race to use.
Relying on an average also dampens the effect of a single candidate's
outstanding personal appeal as well as the idiosyncrasies arising from
the support a candidate receives from "friends and neighbors," even
of the opposite party.
But use of an index of several races is not without flaws. Candidates for major races, stich as governor or United States Senator,
especially candidates of a minority party, tend to run highly personal
campaigns virtually divorced from partisan identification." Conversely, since minor offices frequently are held for long periods by
incumbents with high name familiarity, the traditional vote for them
hardly reflects current partisan strength. A possible way to lessen the
effect of atypical races would be to use as the base percentage the
average of a limited number of election contests, for example, an
average of the statewide races remaining after eliminating those races
with the widest margins of both victory and defeat.
A further choice affecting the base percentage is whether it
should be selected from a single year or from several years. Any single
year may be atypical, for example, because a party's popularity is
temporarily depressed by adverse publicity. On the other hand, if the
base percentage is to be derived by averaging the outcomes of several
elections over time, changing precinct lines and population movements among precincts vastly complicate preparation and evaluation
of data.
The final consideration in the choice among various possible base
40.

See W.

FLANIGAN

& N. ZINGALE, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

OF THE

AMEImcAN

ELEcToRATE 44 (3d ed. 1975).
41.

See R. AGRANOFF,

THE MANAGEMENT OF ELEcroON CAMPIGNs 38 (1976).
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percentages should be their correspondence to the state's normal
vote. While the normal vote can be neither feasibly applied as a base
percentage12 nor broken down by legislative districts, it does serve as
an index against which to assess the reasonableness of the base percentage actually chosen.
C.

DETERMINING FAIR REPRESENTATION

Picking the standard of fair representation against which a given
districting plan will be judged is the most value-laden choice in the
development of a measure of gerrymandering. In a nutshell, the issue
is whether majority rule or proportional representation for the minority is to be preferred, since, as will be demonstrated, the two may
be mutually exclusive.
At first it seemed obvious that a proportional representation
standard should be adopted. Such a standard would have defined fair
representation as a situation in which both parties control the same
percentage of legislative districts as their statewide base percentage.
This method seemed the fairest because it appeared to give each
party exactly what it deserved. Extended examination of the consequences of using a proportional representation standard, however,
showed that it is impossible to give both parties what they deserve
at the same time. Because a proportional representation districting
standard will be unfair to one party or the other, a choice must be
made as to whether the majority or the minority party is to be favored.
The explanation for this seeming paradox lies in the operation
of what we call the "balloon effect," which causes the percentage of
3
the majority party's votes to be inflated in terms of seats gained.1
42. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
43. The reason the balloon effect operates as it does is attributable to the geographic distribution of partisans within a state. If partisans were uniformly distributed
throughout all legislative districts, the party that received 51% of the statewide vote
would also have 51% of the vote in every legislative district. Accordingly, every vote
of the losing party would be wasted and the majority party would control all legislative
seats. If, by contrast, all partisans were segregated geographically within the state,
then the percentage of districts dominated by each of the two political parties would
be roughly equivalent to that party's statewide percentage. In this situation, the extra
votes of the majority party in those districts it dominates would be wasted. In reality,
of course, voters are neither distributed evenly by party within a state nor completely
segregated; yet a party that achieves 51% of the vote is almost certain to be in a
majority in more than 51% of the districts.
The balloon effect has been demonstrated empirically. Because the percentage of
districts won by the dominant party tends to be higher than its percentage of the
statewide popular vote, Dixon has observed that single-member districting creates at
least a mild bias in favor of the dominant party. See R. DIXON, Ja., supra note 22, at
50-54. See generallyD. RAE, supra note 28, at 72; Tufte, supra note 24, at 544-46.
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With only slight reflection, the reality of the balloon effect becomes
apparent. For example, in an election in which the winning candidate
received 75% of the vote statewide, we would probably not expect
that candidate to lose in one quarter of the districts. George McGovern polled over one-third of the national vote in 1972, but carried only
Massachusetts and the District of Columbia," which represent
slightly fewer than four percent of the "districts."
Given the balloon effect, every percentage point increase in the
statewide percentage for one party typically translates to more than
a one percentage point gain in the districts it would dominate." If a
reapportionment plan is specially designed to limit a 55% majority
party to being in a majority in 55% of the districts, at such time as
that party in fact receives only fifty percent of the votes, it would
likely be dominant in fewer than fifty percent of the districts.46 Because the majority party would not, in the latter situation, control the
legislature, it would not be in a position to implement its legislative
goals. To us, the likelihood of a minority party actually dominating
the majority is intolerable.47 Indeed, to illustrate how unpopular this
result would be, imagine the adverse public reaction that would follow if the electoral college were to give the presidency to a minority
candidate.
On the other hand, one might understandably feel that the protection of full minority p6tential is more important to American values than the principle of majority rule, and thus be willing to exchange a guarantee of majority rule for the assurance that the minority would get their full quota of legislative seats. Accordingly, in
designing a measure of gerrymandering, one might want to counteract the balloon effect to safeguard the interests of the minority.
Because our value choice comes down on the side of majority
rule, however, we prefer to let the balloon effect benefit the majority
party rather than deflate it via a standard of proportional representation. We therefore define fair representation as a situation in which
the majority party is assured of maintaining its numerical supremacy
in a majority of districts if its statewide percentage-whatever the
actual figure-is reduced to a bare majority: in a two-party system,
44. See U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTPmcT
364-65 (94th ed. 1973).
45. We will illustrate this with actual data in the case study. See text accompanying note 62 infra.
46. This is illustrated hypothetically in figure 1-a, Appendix at p. 1150 infra.
47. Many scholars have argued that the majority party deserves an opportunity
to accomplish its legislative goals. Under this party government model, if the majority
party then abuses the power given it, the electorate will know whom to blame and can
take appropriate action in the next election. For the standard apologia for effective
majority rule, see E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GovERNMENT (1942).
OF THE UNrrED STATES
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fifty-plus percent of the vote." Thus, rather than measuring the degree of fair representation in a proposed districting plan by comparing the proportion of districts in which the statewide majority party
would be in a majority with its statewide base percentage, we look to
see whether the majority party would dominate a majority of districts
if its statewide base percentage were reduced to a bare majority-the
adjusted base percentage. If, for example, the Democrats' statewide
base percentage is 55%, they are fairly represented as long as they
would be in the majority in fifty percent of the districts if their base
percentage total in each district was reduced by five percentage
points. Any other result would constitute misrepresentation. Continuing the above example, if, after adjusting its base percentage in
each district, the Democratic party is in a majority in only 43% of the
districts, then the degree of representation is 43/50, or 86%, and the
party would be underrepresented by fourteen percent. To ensure majority dominance at the fifty percent level, a bigger-than-proportional
standard of district dominance will have to be tolerated when the
majority party receives more than a bare majority of the vote.49 Counterbalancing this reward to the majority, however, the use of an adjusted base percentage to determine fair representation also means
that the minority will be assured of being dominant in a majority of
districts should it attain a majority statewide. Thus, this proposed
method of measuring fair representation checks the usual gerrymandering pattern in which the majority party draws the districts in such
48. The adjustment is made by reducing each precinct by a uniform absolute
percentage, determined by taking the difference between the statewide base percentage and fifty percent. To illustrate this assumption, assume a party with a statewide
base of 55%. Applying the uniform absolute percentage, each precinct would be reduced by five percentage points, regardless of whether the original figure was 75% or
25%.
An alternative method, which we reject, would be to reduce each precinct by a
constant proportional amount. Using the foregoing illustration, a five percentage point
difference (55% to 50%) would result in a constant proportion of 5/55 or 9.1%. This
method would thus require a subtraction of seven percentage points from a district
with a 77% vote and a subtraction of three percentage points from a district with a
33% vote.
The rationale for adjusting all districts by a uniform absolute percentage rather
than a proportional amount is based on a phenomenon termed the "uniform national
swing." See generally D. BuTLER & D. STOKES, POLmCAL CHANGE IN BUTAiN 140-51 (2d
ed. 1974). Butler and Stokes believe this empirically demonstrated phenomenon to
arise from two tendencies that counteract each other: national influences, which tend
to be proportional to existing party support, and local persuasive personal contacts,
which tend to draw additional strength to the already dominant party. See id. at 143.
Tufte concurs in the belief that the principle conforms to reality, stating that percentage swings are relatively independent of starting point and are therefore best
assessed in terms of untransformed percentage point differences. See Tufte, supra note
24, at 545.
49. The relationship is shown hypothetically in figure 1-b, Appendix at p. 1150
infra.
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a way that it will be dominant in a majority of them even if it loses
its statewide majority.
Once the essential choices of definition, base race, and a standard of fair representation have been made, a districting plan can be
tested for gerrymandering. The test consists of two steps: measuring
the degree to which the plan deviates from the standard of fair representation and ascertaining whether it is possible to reduce that deviation. If there is no deviation, the plan is obviously not a gerrymander.
Even if there is some deviation, however, the plan will still not constitute a gerrymander so long as that deviation cannot be further reduced. Thus, before it can be said with certainty that gerrymandering
has occurred, it must be determined whether those who designed the
districting scheme had any leeway for adjustment, that is, any discretion in what they could achieve in terms of gaining advantages for a
particular party or weakening its opponents.
Given the natural concentration of partisans in any state and a
set of minimum standards for compactness, population equality, and
adherence to subdivision lines, there will be both a maximum and
minimum percentage of districts in which each party could be dominant. This spread is the band of discretion available to district drawers. For example, if with an existing concentration of partisans in a
state the minimum percentage of districts in which a given party
could be a majority is 45 and the maximum is 60, the spread between
45 and 60 is the band of discretion for drawing districts.
The magnitude of the specific band of discretion for districting
in any situation depends upon four criteria: (1) the required degree
of compactness of districts, (2) the allowable deviation from population equality, (3) the required degree of adherence to subdivision
lines, and (4) the relationship between the size of legislative body and
state population. To the extent the allowed tolerances in the above
criteria are narrow, the band of discretion within which district designers must operate is restricted. Thus, for example, if district designers are required to adhere rigorously to subdivision lines, they are
constrained from building a majority within a district by joining portions of the population with several adjoining units. In theory, it
might seem possible to eliminate all possibilities for gerrymandering
by simultaneously enforcing strict standards for all criteria, thus
eliminating the band of discretion entirely. In practice, however, this
is not possible" since the foregoing criteria interact in such a manner
that applying one standard strictly necessarily requires the relaxation
of some other standard.

50. See Morrill, Ideal and Reality in Reapportionment, 63 ANALS A. AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 463, 475 (1973).
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in summary, the decisional rules governing the determination
whether a specific reapportionment plan is a gerrymander are as
follows:
(1) If, after reducing the majority party's legislative
vote totals in each district by the difference between that
party's percentage in the base race and fifty percent, the
majority is dominant in exactly fifty percent of the districts,
the plan is obviously fair, and one need not look at it further.
(2) If the majority party has not achieved fair representation, but has achieved the maximum number of districts
possible given the band of discretion, there is no gerrymander. Since there is no way, given the criteria of compactness,
population equality, adherence to subdivision lines, and the
ratio of legislative size to population, for the majority party
to reach fair representation, it cannot blame its underrepresentation on gerrymandering.51
(3) If the majority party has received less than fair representation, and has not achieved its full potential advantage, the designers have engaged in a gerrymander against
the majority.
(4) If the majority party predominates in more than
fifty percent of the districts, it is overrepresented. If, however, there is no potential for reducing this advantage, the
plan is not a gerrymander. In this instance the natural
spread of the majority is such that there .is no way its overrepresentation can be reduced. This unfairness can either be
written off as unavoidable given the operation of the existing
criteria, or ultimately a change in the criteria may be sought.
(5) If the majority party is overrepresented, but there
is potential to reduce its advantage, this plan is a gerrymander against the minority.
In short, the justification for applying these rules to determine
when a gerrymander has occurred is that it is reasonable to accuse
district drafters of gerrymandering only when they fail to deal with
the disadvantaged party as fairly as they might given the band of
discretion within which they must operate. As long as they have done
51. The only way in which this situation could ultimately be remedied would be
to change the underlying criteria that affect the band of discretion that restricts districting possibilities. For example, compactness requirements could be changed, moving the band of districting potential and thus enabling the districting authorities to
give the majority increased representation. Or the size of the legislature could be
changed, perhaps enabling the majorit4r to assemble majorities in a higher percentage

of districts.
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all that is possible to achieve fair representation, there can be no
gerrymander.

IV. A CASE STUDY
By way of illustration, the proposed method will be used to test
the 1972 Minnesota state senate districting plan for gerrymandering." The parameters of the 1972 plan were determined by a three52. A summary of the history of redistricting in Minnesota may be helpful in
setting the stage for the case study. For a comprehensive source for the period 1857
to 1955, see J. Bond, Legislative Reapportionment in Minnesota (June 1956) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in University of Minnesota Library).
The Minnesota State Constitution of 1857 mandated equal population districting
for both houses of the legislature. See MiNN. CONST. of 1857, art. IV, § 2. Until the early
1900's the legislature attempted to comply with this mandate by simply adding new
members to represent areas where population had increased. Because of the practice
of trying to give each county at least one representative, however, and because legislators were reluctant to split county lines in redistricting, discrepancies in population
among districts arose. Moreover, by 1881, a systematic discrimination against the
metropolitan area became apparent.
In response to these problems, a largely Republican/progressive-controlled legislature redistricted the state following the 1912 elections. That plan was challenged in
1914 as not having strictly adhered to the standard of population equality, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the plan, indicating in the process that the equal
population requirement in the constitution did not in fact require uniformity of population, that is, an equal number of inhabitants in each district, as long as the legislature had made a "good faith effort. . . to give the state as fair an apportionment act
as could be enacted . . .without ulterior or improper motives." State ex rel. Meighen
v. Weatherill, 125 Minn. 336, 343, 147 N.W. 105, 107 (1914). This pronouncement
seemed to preclude resort to the courts to remedy problems of unequal representation.
In 1957, however, well before the Supreme Court articulated the one person/one

vote standard in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), a group of metropolitan area
citizens sued in federal court for redress of their unequal representation. See Magraw
v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958). The court accepted jurisdiction, heard
the evidence of gross population inequities, and decided that relief was appropriate.
The court, however, stopped short of entering a judgment, saying that it could not
believe that the legislature would fail to perform its clear duty to redistrict. See id. at
187. Nonetheless, as insurance, the court retained jurisdiction over the case. The
legislature heeded this warning and passed a redistricting act, but postponed the
effective date until 1962 to allow state senators then in office to finish their four-year
terms. See Act of June 15, 1959, ch. 45, 1959 Minn. Ex. Sess. Laws 1494 (repealed
1966). The legislature's action satisfied the metropolitan plaintiffs, who withdrew their
suit. The briefs prepared for the Minnesota plaintiffs were subsequently sent to Tennessee where they were used successfully by the attorneys in Baker. See Mazie,
Friendly Banter Helped Spark Reapportionment Suit, Minneapolis Tribune, Jan. 5,
1965, at 31, col. 1.
In 1964, anticipating the action of the United States Supreme Court in setting a
one person/one vote standard, Governor Karl Rolvaag appointed a seventeen-member
bipartisan Reapportionment Commission to draw a plan that he could present to the
Legislature. See Minn. Exec. Order No. 14 (July 28, 1964). The Commission drew up
guidelines, aiming for a population disparity between districts of not over 1.5:1
(±twenty percent). While the Commission was preparing its plan, a group of subur-
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ban local government officeholders sued in federal district court asking the court to
redistrict based upon either the 1966 population to be determined by special census
or the 1960 population figures, the only figures then available throughout the state.
See Honsey v. Donovan, 236 F. Supp. 8 (D. Minn. 1964). While ruling that the 1959
redistricting plan was unconstitutionally unequal, the court again indicated its reluctance to redistrict on its own, preferring instead to give the legislature and governor a
chance to work out a mutually acceptable plan. See id. at 21. Nevertheless, the court
retained jurisdiction over the case.
Under judicial threat once more, the legislature, dominated by the "conservative"
faction, see note 60 infra, set about to redistrict itself, ignoring the Governor's Commission report. See C. Backstrom, Problems and Strategies of Reapportionment in Minnesota (May 7, 1965) (paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Minnesota Academy
of Science). The resulting plan, S.F. 102, 64th Minn. Legis., 1965 Sess., was calculated
by one member of the Governor's Commission to contain a population disparity of 2:1.
See C. Backstrom, Population Variance from Average House Districts (1965) (unpublished report to Minnesota Governor Karl Rolvaag). Because the disparity was considered too great, the Governor vetoed the plan. See JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 64TH MINN.
LIos., 1965 Sass. 2554-59 (1965). Thereupon a suit was instituted by the Minnesota
Senate challenging the power of the governor to veto redistricting acts, See Duxbury
v. Donovan, 272 Minn. 424, 138 N.W.2d 692 (1965). The lower court had ruled against
the Governor on the ground that the language of the state constitution said specifically
that redistricting was a function of the "legislature," in contrast to other language
requiring action pursuant to "law." The lower court's reasoning, however, was rejected
by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which held that the act of the legislature was subject
to veto by the governor, though the legislature was, of course, free to override the veto.
See id. at 442, 138 N.W.2d at 704.
By this time, the United States Supreme Court had indicated clearly that it would
invalidate redistricting plans that failed to come as close as possible to the equal
population standard. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Consequently, the
Governor reconvened his Reapportionment Commission to draw a tighter plan. one
that did not deviate more than =- five percent.
Governor Rolvaag presented a new plan to a special session of the legislature on
April 25, 1966, but the legislature came up with its own plan; see S.F. 2, 64th Minn.
Legis., 1966 Ex. Sess., which the Governor vetoed, see JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 64TH
MINN. LaoIS., 1966 Ex. Sass. 126-30 (1967). Further compromises were made, and a
new districting act was finally passed and signed. See Act of May 20, 1966, ch. 1, 1966
Minn. Ex. Sess. Laws (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 2.021-.712 (1976)).
Only four years later, however, with the 1970 census data available, the
Republican-controlled legislature confronted another Democratic governor over the
issue of redistricting. In-response to a suit brought in federal district court, see Beens
v. .Erdahl' 336 F. Supp. 715 (D. Minn.), vacated and remanded per curiam sub nom.
Sixty-seventh Minn. State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972), the legislature passed
a plan, H.F. 76, 67th Minn. Legis., 1971 Ex. Sess., which Governor Wendell Anderson
pocket-vetoed. At that point, the three-judge federal court panel intervened,
found that Minnesota had again failed to comply with the one person/one vote standard, and, in the process of redistricting, cut the size of the Senate by almost one-half
and the House by about one-fourth. See 336 F. Supp. at 721. The Senate appealed to
the United States Supreme Court, which held that the district court had overstepped
its authority in cutting legislative size. See Sixty-seventh Minn. State Senate v. Beens,
406 U.S. 187 (1972) (per curiam). Restricted to keeping the legislature at its previous
size, except for the reduction of one House seat, the district court drew the present
lines. See Beens v. Erdahl, 349 F. Supp. 97 (D. Minn. 1972).
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judge United States district court." The court required the district
drawing masters to adhere to a tight standard of population equality,5" to maximize compactness and the number of county and municipal boundaries preserved, and to ignore partisan and personal
considerations." The final plan divided the state into 29 metropolitan
senate districts, 34 essentially outstate districts, and 4 mixed districts. 6
A.

CHOOSING A BASE FOR MEASURING PARTY STRENGTH

Our choice as the best indicator of base partisan strength in
Minnesota prior to the 1972 redistricting is the race for governor in
1970. The reasons for this selection are that two equally popular
candidates faced each other for an open seat held by a retiring oneterm Republican after a decade of alternation in party control. Moreover, both parties were well organized and financed. These are all
conditions for a straightforward party contest uncontaminated by
extraneous factors. In addition, the governor's race in 1970 did not
exhibit regional idiosyncrasies that could distort the base percentage,
as is evidenced by the high correlation 7 between the precinct-byprecinct vote for governor and that for all other statewide races. Finally, the 54.27% by which the Democratic candidate won" is very
near the 54% state "normal vote" generally attributed to the Democratic party for that period."

53. See Beens v. Erdabl, 349 F. Supp. 97 (D. Minn. 1972).
54. Deviations were not to exceed two percent. See Beens v. Erdahl, 336 F. Supp.
715, 719 (D. Minn.), vacated and remandedper curiam sub nom. Sixty-seventh Minn.

State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972).
55. See Beens v. Erdahl, 349 F. Supp. 97, 98 (D. Minn. 1972) ("[wie have
followed the criteria set forth in. . . 336 F. Supp. 715"); Beens v. Erdahl, 336 F. Supp.
715, 719 (D. Minn.), vacated and remandedper curiam sub nom. Sixty-seventh Minn.
State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972).
56. See Beens v. Erdahl, 349 F. Supp. 97, 98 (D. Minn. 1972).
57. Our study indicated a correlation of .96. This conclusion, and others cited in
this case study section of the Article, is derived from a computer study conducted
during the first half of 1975. The full results of that study are on file with author
Backstrom and will be hereinafter cited as Computer Study.
58. See THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATIrV MANUAL. 1971-1972, at 455.
59. Two studies of Minnesota elections cite a normal vote of this magnitude. See
R. Crew & W. Flanigan, The Impact of a Favorite Son Candidacy: Humphrey in
Minnesota in 1968, at 1 (Apr. 29, 1971) (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association) (normal vote of 53.8%); W. Flanigan & N.
Zingale, A Normal Vote Analysis of the Minnesota Electorate 5 (May 5, 1972) (paper
delivered at the annual meeting of the Minnesota Academy of Science) (normal vote
of 55%). See generally A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER, &D. STOKES, supra note
37.
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MEASURING THE DEGREE OF FAIR REPRESENTATION IN THE PLAN

Having chosen the base percentage, the next step is to test the
districting plan for fair representation. To do this, we compare the
percentage of districts in which the majority is dominant to its adjusted statewide base partisan strength. It must be remembered that
our procedure requires that the base percentage be reduced to fiftyplus percent. This step ascertains whether the majority party, if reduced to a bare majority, would be dominant in a majority of the
districts.
The Minnesota case provides an excellent demonstration of why
it is important to measure fair representation in this manner. Using
the actual base race percentage before reduction (54.27% statewide),
Democrats" are in the majority in 44 districts, Republicans in 23
districts in the court plan." This dominance in 66% of the districts
is a predictable consequence of the previously mentioned balloon

effect, as a result of which the percentage of seats obtained by a party
having more than a bare majority statewide will be greater than fifty
percent."2

The finding in the Minnesota case that the Democrats were in
60. From 1913 until 1973, Minnesota legislators were elected without party designation on the ballot. Nonetheless, in this case study, reference is made to Republicans
and Democrats when discussing legislative races. In fact, virtually all candidates were
endorsed by regular party organizations, and legislators divided themselves into liberal
and conservative caucuses that corresponded almost exactly to their party preferences.
A 1967 study estimated that two-thirds of the conservative senators and three-fourths
of the conservative representatives were Republican party-oriented and that no Democratic Faimer-Labor party members caucused with the conservatives. See C. Backstrom, The Minnesota Legislature (June 7, 1967) (paper prepared for Minnesota-

Dakotas regional session of the American-Assembly on State Legislatures in American
Politics).
61. See S. Eller, The Political Effects of Reapportionment: A Case Study 49
(May 8, 1973) (unpublished honors thesis, University of Minnesota).

62. A graphic depiction of the differential increases in district dominance for
each percentage point increase in popular vote in Minnesota is set out in figure 2,
Appendix at p. 1152 infra. Data collected for other years show that this finding is not
atypical of Minnesota. For example, the Democratic candidates running statewide in
1972 dominated legislative districts as follows:
Race

Statewide percentage

Percent of districts
dominated

United States Senator

56.9

75

State Public Service
Commissioner

51.7

60

President

47.2

34

See THE MINNSOTA LEnsLATrvE MA~uAL 1973-1974, at 534-37.
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a majority in a larger percentage of districts than their actual statewide percentage in no way establishes that there was a gerrymander
in their favor under the court plan. To discover whether the court
plan gave fair representation to the majority party, using our proposal, which allows the balloon effect to have its normal effect, we
adjusted the base percentage down to 50.01%. This was done by
reducing the governor's actual vote in every precinct across the state
by 4.26%, the difference between his statewide average and 50.01%,
and readding the totals in each legislative district." The result was
that the Democrats were found to be in a majority in only 32 of the
67 districts."4 Since using the adjusted base percentage gave the Democrats a majority in only 48% of the districts instead of the fifty
percent minimum, they had 48/50 or 96% of their fair representation;
in other words, they were underrepresented by four percent. Using
this method it is clear that despite what might be the initial impression, the court's plan did not unduly favor the Democrats.
C.

POTENTLAL FOR ADJUSTMENT

Whether the underrepresentation of the Democrats in the court
plan can validly be termed a gerrymander, however, requires the
further step of ascertaining whether it would have been possible
within the band of discretion to produce a fairer plan. To anticipate
our findings, there is a great potential for changing the dominant
majority in districts in Minnesota. Actual district drawers, desiring
to create a fair plan by our standards, would have had to move only
a few lines according to the techniques presented below before achieving the small correction required. While our immediate concern was
to establish that there was the potential for increasing the dominance
of the majority to achieve fair representation in Minnesota, we decided, for purposes of illustration, to establish the extremes of the
band of discretion in both directions.
Describing the band is far easier than actually establishing the
bounds. A computer program that could optimize first one party's
63. The procedure involves several steps. First, the percentage necessary to reduce the statewide base percentage to 50.01 is calculated. Next, for each precinct in a
district the actual raw vote for the base race is totaled, and a percentage is taken. Then
the statewide reduction percentage is subtracted from the precinct percentage and the
resulting adjusted percentage multiplied by the total actual vote to yield an adjusted
raw vote figure. When all precincts have been calculated, the adjusted vote for a
legislative district is added and the district adjusted percentage calculated. The reason
that the adjusted vote for each precinct must be calculated separately is to have the
data available if the precinct is moved to another district during the drawing of alternative plans. The adjusted base percentage can then readily be figured for these new
districts. An illustration of this process is contained in table 1, Appendix at p. 1153

infra.
64.

See Computer Study, supra note 57.
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strength and then the other's might seem ideal as a means of defining
the outer parameters of the band of discretion. The major effort of
this type has been Nagel's districting program, 5 which has been used
in California, and which is typical of most computerized efforts in
this field to date in being relatively inflexible in the types of manipulations possible."
To achieve more flexibility, we opted for the traditional
"manual, patient experimental approach"6 toward maximizing each
party's potential. Wherever possible, the basic objective was to place
opposition voters in either "overkill" districts-where additions to
their margin of victory do them no good-or "waste districts"-where
despite a very large vote they are still in the minority. More specifically, we used five techniques available to district drafters to maximize party potential.68
First, the district drafters may discover that a party has a minority enclave split among several opposition districts and carve out
a district in which that enclave is a majority. Second, an oppositiondominated district may be eroded until the remaining district is
dominated by the party seeking to increase its dominance. This is
accomplished by assigning precincts dominated by the opposition
party to several surrounding districts already under opposition control, where they are harmlessly absorbed. Third, two adjacent districts can often be partitioned so that both districts are dominated
by a single party, whereas previously control of the districts was
divided. Fourth, precincts at the borders of two districts can be
traded to gain the desired partisan balance. Fifth, heavy opposition
precincts can be detached from surrounding districts and packed into
a district already controlled by the opposition, thus enhancing the
chances of the district drawer's party in the surrounding districts.
Each of these techniques is dependent for its success on the existence
of a few heavily partisan precincts within marginal districts since, to
the extent a district is heavily dominated by one party or the other,
its partisan makeup is generally not subject to manipulation.
In applying the five techniques discussed above to establish the
extremes of the band of discretion in Minnesota, we accepted as
limitations on our redistricting efforts the criteria for district drawing
adopted by the court. 9 With respect to the criterion of population
65. Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting, 17 STAN. L. RVy. 863
(1965).
66. On the uses and limitations of the computer in reapportionment, see Craig,
Reapportionment and the Computer,6 LAw & CompurER TECH. 50 (1973).
67. Morrill, supra note 50, at 472.
68. For schematic illustrations of these techniques, see figure 3, Appendix at p.
1154 infra.
69. A comparison of the criteria used in the court's plan and those used in this
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equality, the court was explicit, ordering a deviation of no more than
plus or minus two percent." The court was vague as to the weight that
should be given to other criteria-compactness and respect for subdivision lines-merely identifying these as general considerations without quantitative specifications. We chose specific measures for these
criteria, applied them to the court's final plan, and sought to ensure
that our own plans approximated the court's in these regards. 7'
D.

SUMMARY

OF CASE STUDY RESULTS

We strongly believe that, given adherence to the criteria of population equality, respect for subdivision lines, and compactness, the
results of our study indicate the maximum and minimum number of
districts each party might control in Minnesota. No further adjustment could have been made because of the absence of critically close
districts7" or, where marginal districts remain, because of the unavailability of surrounding precincts of the right partisan proclivity.73
This means that under the plan, at either extreme of the district
drawer's band of discretion, there were simply no more readily capturable districts.
The party balance in one extreme plan places the Democrats in
a majority in only 22 of the 67 districts; at the other extreme, the
Democrats control 39 districts.74 Using these plans, the degree of
Democratic representation, as defined earlier, could range from 66%
study is contained in table 2, Appendix at p. 1155 infra; The comparison of the resulting plans used these criteria is shown in table 1, Appendix at p. 1153 infra; the districting schemes themselves appear as figures 4, 5, and 6, Appendix at pp. 1156-58
infra.
70. See Beens v. Erdahl, 336 F. Supp. 715, 719 (D. Minn.), vacated and remanded per curiam sub nom. Sixty-seventh Minn. State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S.
187 (1972). Our maximum and minimum plans fall within the court's guideline.
71. Specifically, while our plan for maximizing Democratic control violated one
more local boundary line than did the court in its plan, our minimum plan equalled
the court's in its adherence to boundary lines, splitting five more counties than did
the court but healing five splits in municipalities.
As for compactness, we compared our extreme plans with the court's by a geometric device, which enabled us to determine how closely each district came to fully
occupying a circle that circumscribed it. Using this device, the court plan had a mean
compactness ratio of .50, with a standard deviation of .11; our Democratic maximum
plan had a mean ratio of .47, with a standard deviation of .12, while our Democratic
minimum plan had a mean ratio of.47, with a standard deviation of.13. For a description of various compactness measures, see Papayanopoulis, Quantitative Principles
Underlying Apportionment Methods, 219 N.Y. AcAD. Sci. ANNALS 185 (1973). On the
problem of operationalizing all these criteria, see NATIONAL MuNIciPAL LEAGUE, CONFLicTs AMONG POSSmLE CRrEIuA FOR RATIONAL DISTRIrGM (1967).

72. See table 3, Appendix at p. 1159 infra.
73. Maps of Minnesota showing the three districting plans may be found in
figures 4, 5, and 6, Appendix at pp. 1156-58 infra.
74. See table 3, Appendix at p. 1159 infra.
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to 116%.11 Thus, even with the use of reasonably tight criteria, a very
wide potential for district adjustment was possible in Minnesota.
In the court plan, the Democrats, when their base percentage is
adjusted to fifty-plus percent, were in the majority in only 32 of the
67 districts, therefore being underrepresented by four percent."6 At
the same time, there was potential for adjusting the districts to provide the Democrats with a fairer representation. Thus, since the
Democrats were underrepresented by four percent, and since the underrepresentation was susceptible to correction, the court's plan constituted an anti-Democratic gerrymander, albeit a small one of four
percent.
Our study indicates that, at a maximum, there were seven more
districts that could have been drawn with Democratic majorities
without violating the constraints of population equality, compactness, and preservation of subdivision lines." To avoid an antiDemocratic gerrymander, the optimal plan would be to add any two
of these districts to the 32 districts in the court plan. Such a plan
would yield a degree of representation of 102%.11 Although this provides a small Democratic overrepresentation, the result is as close to
perfect as we could achieve without underrepresenting the majority,
and therefore it is not a gerrymander.
Calling the court's plan a gerrymander, as we have defined it,
does not mean that this was the intended effect of the court's action.
At the same time, this small gerrymander should not automatically
be considered either trivial or inconsequential. In political matters,
such small margins may be quite significant. Even more important,
any negative gerrymander means that if the majority party were to
obtain only a bare majority of the votes statewide, it would not be
dominant in a majority of districts.
E. AcTuAL )ELECTION REsuITs
Despite our insistence on a prospective rather than retrospective
measure of gerrymandering, the reader may be interested in the outcome of the senatorial elections in the court-drawn districts. In November 1972, the Democratic party gained control of the Minnesota
75. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra. Under the minimum plan, see
table 3, Appendix at p. 1159 infra; figure 6, Appendix at p. 1158 infra, the Democrats

are in the majority in 33% of the districts (22 of 67);-the degree of representation is
33/50 or 66%. Under the maximum plan, see table 3, Appendix at p. 1159 infra;
figure 5, Appendix at p. 1157 infra, the Democrats are in the majority in 58% of the
districts (39 of 67); the degree of representation is 58/50 or 116%.
76. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
77. See table 3, Appendix at p. 1159 infra; figure 5, Appendix at p. 1157 infra.
78. Under the suggested optimal plan, the Democrats would be in a majority in
51% of the districts (34 of 67).
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state senate for the first time in history, by a 37-30 margin. 9 Interviews we conducted with state legislators indicate that many thought
the court's plan was a conscious pro-Democratic gerrymander, 0 illustrating that the losing party is unlikely to be convinced that it was
dealt with fairly, even if the districting plan was drawn by a court or
an independent commission. By the traditional after-the-fact examination of legislative election results, moreover, the allegation of a proDemocratic gerrymander appeared to be substantiated. Counting
two-party contested races only, the Republican senate candidates
polled 743,905 votes while the Democrats polled 740,844 votes.'1
As the reader will by now recognize, we do not feel that these
returns prove a Democratic gerrymander. On the whole, Democratic
victors may have won by slight margins or in low turnout areas, while
Republican candidates may have had bigger margins of victory and
achieved substantial votes even in losing efforts."2 Moreover, as suggested earlier, legislative vote totals are apt to be distorted by a
variety of idiosyncrasies that make the legislative vote statewide an
unreliable indicator of partisan strength. By way of illustrating the
effect that idiosyncratic factors may have on election results, according to our measure, the districting plan in effect prior to the 1972
Minnesota reapportionment was virtually identical to the courtdrawn plan in terms of partisan advantage, yet Republicans won
control of the Senate in both 1966 and 1970.3
Finally, a measure of gerrymandering that is available only after
an election can, by definition, never be a cure. The fatal defect in the
traditional method of analysis remains that it does not allow district
planners to know prior to adoption of a districting scheme whether
fair representation has been achieved.
79. Although no party designations were made until April 1973, see note 60
supra, one means of determining party control was to identify the caucuses according
to the vote for President of the Senate, which is taken on the first day of the session.
For the 1973 Session, the Senate split 37-30 between the nominee of the DemocraticFarmer-Labor caucus, Alec Olson, a proclaimed Democrat, and John Olson, the nominee of the conservative caucus. See JouRNAL op Tm SENATz,68TH MINN. Lols., 1973
Sass. 6-7 (1973).

80. Among those interviewed there was widespread, though not necessarily unanimous, consensus that there was a Democratic gerrymander. Interviews with Senators
Ralph Doty, J.A. Josefson, Mel Hansen, Roger Hanson, Alec Olson, Stanley Thorup,
Myrton Wegener, and Gerald Willet, and Representative Richard Parish, in St. Paul
(Feb. 12-19, 1973).
81.

These totals were derived from THE MINNEsoTA LEGISLATivE MANuAL 1973-

1974, at 540-45.
82. For an extended discussion of the effects of redistricting on individual senate
contests, see S. Eller, supra note 61, at 88-110.
83. Specifically, using the same base race (governor, 1970) reduced to fifty percent, Democrats were in a majority in 31 of the 67 districts-only one less than in the
current districts. See Computer Study, supra note 57.
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FINAL THOUGHTS

We have presented our approach to the issue of partisan gerrymandering and have shown how it would apply to the Minnesota
reapportionment plan of 1972. We submit that future studies of gerrymandering will have to focus, as ours has done, on developing clearcut rules for identifying and correcting gerrymanders. Those seriously
concerned with resolving the problem cannot be satisfied with an
analysis that involves nothing more than an impressionistic eyeballing of a map or with an after-the-fact evaluation of the effect of a
redistricting plan already adopted.
We are by no means asserting that our formulation constitutes
the final word on gerrymandering. Some observers will disagree with
our assessment of the balloon effect, preferring instead a standard
based on pure proportional representation despite the possible adverse consequences acceptance of such a standard may have for the
majority. Differences of opinion may also exist over the appropriate
measure of statewide partisan strength. Finally, our suggested measure may be rejected by some as simply too complicated.
Because of the difficulties inherent in devising an acceptable
measure of gerrymandering, some scholars have concluded no legal
action should be taken to combat partisan gerrymandering., We,
however, feel that the search for a precise definition, an appropriate
data base, and a valid standard of fair representation will ultimately
yield a technical measure that will enable the courts to act prudently
to remedy partisan gerrymandering.
We do not, however, advocate that courts become the ordinary
vehicle for actually drawing legislative districts. On the contrary, we
feel that this task can be most effectively done by an independent
bipartisan commission."5 A nonlegislative, bipartisan commission
would avoid -pro-incumbent favoritism typically produced by legislators and eliminate the necessity for the courts to undertake a function to which they do not bring unique expertise. But the view of
many reformers that a reapportionment commission could or would
ignore their political knowledge while marking out districts on the
map is naive. Moreover, the proposal that such commissions should
be blinded to the political aspects of their plan is dangerous because,
as we have shown, a gerrymander may be created unintentionally
that is no less distasteful and undemocratic than if it were created
purposefully.
84. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 10.
85. For an excellent justification of this approach, see Dixon, The Court, the
People, and "One Man, One Vote," in RPPORTMONMENT IN THE 1970's, supranote 10,
at 735-39.
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While we do not suggest that the political effects of a districting
scheme could or should be ignored, we do suggest that the goal of the
districting process must be fair representation rather than partisan
political advantage. The development of an objective measure of partisan gerrymandering should aid in achieving this goal, for once clear
districting guidelines are established that eliminate the opportunity
to achieve through the districting process an undeserved political
advantage, legislators will have little incentive to retain control over
what is a cumbersome and time-consuming task. Accordingly, their
willingness to abdicate their power on this question to an independent commission should increase, thus helping to eliminate one of the
last remaining obstacles to fairness in the districting process.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: Operation of the Balloon Effect

Figure 1-b: For a Party
Equalized at 50 %

Figure 1-a: For a Party
Equalized at 55 %
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Statewide percentage
Assume that the relationship in a hypothetical state
is that a one percentage point change in statewide vote
results in a two percentage point change in districts dominated by a given party. Figure 1-a graphs the relationship starting with a party that gets 55 % of the vote statewide being equalized at 55% of the districts dominated.
When it falls to 54% statewide, it will dominate 53% of
the districts; when it gets 53 %, statewide it will dominate
51% of the districts; when it gets 52% (still a majority)
it will dominate only 49% of the districts (a minority
position) ; and so on until when it is at fifty percent
statewide, it will dominate only 45% of the districts.

I
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Figure 1-b graphs the same relationship if that party
is equalized at being dominant in fifty percent of the districts. When that party gets 51% statewide it will dominate °527%of the districts; when it gets 52% statewide it
will dominate 54%; and so on, until when it gets 55%
statewide it will be dominant in sixty percent of the
districts.
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Figure 2: Operation of the Balloon Effect in Minnesota
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The balloon effect as it appears in Minnesota is
shown by plotting the percentage of districts dominated
for each one percent change in the statewide base percentage-Democratic candidate for Governor, 1970. The
slope of this curve over its major course is roughly 3:1;
that is, for every one percentage point rise in the base
race, the percentage of districts dominated rises by three
percentage points. If the rise were strictly proportional,
the curve would have a slope of 1:1, as shown by the
straight line on the graph. The actual Democratic statewide result, 54%, is shown to have resulted in that
party's dominance of 66% of the districts.
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Figure 3: Gerrymandering Techniques
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Table 2: Comparison of Criteria Among Plans

Population
Equality-

Court
Plan

Maximum
Democratic
Plan

(32 -Democratic
35 Republican)

(39 Democratic
28 Republican)

± 2%

Preservation of
Subdivision
Boundaries
a. County Lines
Broken
b. Municipal Lines
Broken
Total Subdivision
Lines Broken
Compactness
(Ratio of District
Area to Area of
Circumscribed Circle)
a. Mean
b. Standard
Deviation

t See text accompanying note 70 supra.

±2%1

Minimum
Democratic
Plan
(22 Democratic
45 Republican)

±t2%
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Figure 4: District Boundaries, Court Plan

Democratic majority,
base race, adjusted
(32 districts)
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Figure 5: District Boundaries, Maximum
Democratic Plan

;m Democratic

majority

base race, adjusted
S (39 districts)
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Figure 6: District Boundaries, Minimum
Democratic Plan

-'

Democratic majority,
base race, adjusted
(22 districts)
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Table 3: Number of Districts by Party Percentage

COURT
PLAN

MAXIMUM
DEMOCRATIC
PLAN

MINIMUM
DEMOCRATIC
PLAN

Percent of base race
vote received by
majority party
(adjusted)
Safe Democratic
(60%+)

12

Fighting Democratic
(55-60%)

8

Marginal Democratic

7

(52-55%)
Critical Democratic

5

15

0

(50-52%)
Critical Republican
(48-50%o Democratic)

3

Marginal Republican
(45-48% Democratic)

10

Fighting Republican
(40-45% Democratic)

12

12

Safe Republican
10
(under 40% Democratic)
TOTAL

32 Dem.
35 Rep.

39 Dem.
28 Rep.

22 Dem.
45 Rep.

